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NOTES
diction of all claims arising from one transaction where one plaintiff
asserts a claim exceeding the requisite jurisdictional amount would accommodate litigants by preventing duplicate suits in state and federal
courts and a multiplicity of suits in state courts where joinder is less
liberal. Although the new interpretation would require a modification
of the judicial practice to strictly construe jurisdictional requirements, it
would permit the policy underlying the Federal Rules, an equally basic
judicial policy, to be more fully implemented.

ACCESS TO OFFICIAL INFORMATION: A NEGLECTED
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
The Las Cruces Sun-News, a New Mexico newspaper, recently
rought permission to attend a United States Navy test firing of a special
rocket at White Sands proving grounds. The request was denied for "security reasons." 1 Earlier this year investigation through confidential
sources revealed that in 1950 the Bureau of Internal Revenue discovered
the adulteration of liquor in 368 taverns in the vicinity of Albany, New
York. The Bureau levied fines upon the offenders without bringing
them into court or revealing the fraud. The Bureau's chief counsel
took the position that such compromises are not matters of public record,
2
but are effected solely in the interest of the individual and the Bureau..
In Oregon, a secret hearing was held by the state board of education
concerning the demand of the dental school to be separated from the
university medical school.3 The board offered to allow a reporter to
attend only on the condition that she pledge to keep the matter "off the
1. Advance clipping from Shop Talk, Oct. 1, 1951, the official publication of the
New Mexico Press Ass'n, Inc.
OF INFORMATION TO AMERICAN
2. INTERIM REPORT OF COMMiTTEE ON FREEmO
SOCIETY OF NEwSPAPER EDITORS 4 (April 21, 1951). Other records not readily available

to the public in New Yoik include marriage licenses. In Yonkers, only 63 of 123 issued
in January and 15 of the 40 obtained in February were made public. Id. at 3. Many
other instances of official secrecy are revealed in Pope, Suppression of News, Atlantic
Monthly, July, 1951, p. 50.
3. Communication to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from the Oregonian. The letter
also describes a secret hearing conducted by the state director of agriculture concerning

certain dairies' violations of the sanitary bottle-cap law. The director took the position
that bad publicity might injure the violators' business.

The secrecy which encompasses meetings of school boards is not peculiar to
Oregon. The public has been barred from school board deliberations in Chicago, Ill.;
Columbia, Mo.; Denver, Colo.; Roanoke, Va.; Providence, R. I.; Evansville, Ind.; Flint,
Mich.; and Baltimore, Md., "just to name a few." Raymond, News the People Can't Get,
Reporter No. 7, Oct. 2, 1951, p. 26.
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record." . These incidents are illustrative of the numerous situations
occurring daily which indicate that government suppression of information is a reality. The withholding of information is not limited to any
particular type of fact nor is the practice confined to any one level of
government.4 Rather, it is a pervasive tendency of public officers to
attempt to function in secrecy. 5
Difficulties presented by the recurring instances of suppression by
-government officials are indeed serious. Their implications extend far
beyond the mere right of a free press to print whatever news it obtains.6
The examples here cited, as well as the countless other instances of concealment, must be regarded in the light of their effect on the American
ideal of self-government.T Where there is alleged justification for keeping
facts from the people, it seems reasonable to require the suppressor to
establish the merit of his position. No court of law would permit
national security to be jeopardized to satisfy the idle curiosity of a
citizen regarding the number of atomic bombs in the United States'
defense stockpiles. Conversely, no court should allow a public official
arbitrarily to decide what facts the people have a right to know, when
the only security involved is his position. Between these extremes lie
many problematic situations which pose a serious challenge to democratic
principles.
4. A recent high' level example is the Secretary of Agriculture's widely publicized
discharge of an assistant to the Production and Marketing Administrator. The Secretary refused to offer any explanation for his action. Similarly, Arizona's Gover.nor
discharged the State Land Commissioner after an investigation and report submitted
by the State Attorney General. Inspection of the report was refused to a reporter of
the Arizona Daily Star on the ground that it was not a public record. INTERIM REPORT,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 2.
The Mayor of Elkton, Md. banned, for a time, two newspapers from its council
meetings after both had published a report of board proceedings allegedly contrary to
the mayor's wishes. Communication to the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL from the American
Newspaper Publishers Association.
5. Representative Keating, of New York, in a letter to Fay Blanchard, wrote:
"There has been a growing tendency all through the Government to clam up on any
information which might tend to reflect discredit on the administration of an agency ..
supra note 2, at 2.
INTERIM REPORT, op. cit.
6. Suppression or distortion of facts by the press is not within the scope of this
discussion. For a comprehensive study of the freedom, responsibilities, and functions
of the press in a free society, see COtMIlSSI N ox FREEDom OF THE PRESS, A FREE AND
RESPONSIBLE PRESS (1946).
7. Benjamin Botts, attempting to procure papers in President Jefferson's possession
for the defense of Aaron Burr, asserted: "In a government of responsibility like ours
where all the agents of the public must be responsible for their conduct, there can be
but few secrets. The people of the United States have a right to know every public
act, everything that is done in a public way by their 'public functionaries. They ought
to know the particulars of public transactions in all their bearings and relations, so
as to be able to distinguish whether and how far they are conducted with fidelity and
ability.. " Aaron Burr's Trial, Robertson's Rep. II, 517 (1808).

NOTES '
Self-government is possible only to the extent that the leaders of
the state are agents responsive to the will of the people.5 If the public
opinion which directs conduct of governmental affairs is to have any
validity; if the people are to be capable of real self-rule, access to all
relevant facts upon which rational judgments may be based must be
provided. 9 A thorough knowledge of official deportment is essential to
protect the electorate from inadvertently condoning the mistakes of those
in power. 10 The importance of freedom of information to a nation
8. See HALL, LIVING LAw OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 88, 89 (1949). Professor Hall
explains consent of the governed in a democracy to mean: ". . . chiefly, the privilege

of all normal adults to vote, the free expression of ideas, and the responsibility of the
government to the governed. It implies not mere approval or acquiescence but active
participation in the processes of government. It implies such a relationship between
citizens and officials that the will of the former is necessary to the right of the latter
to officiate, i.e., the officials are the agents of the citizens. It means that each pers6n
shall potentially have an equal participation in the control of government, with all that
that implies for the determination of questions of public policy, law-making, and lawenforcing. . . . [I]n short, in a democratic society, 'consent of the governed' means
self-rule." See also MEILEIOHN, FREE SPEECH 9 (1948) ; I CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT
AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 40 (1947).
9. "Knowledge will forever govern ignorance. And a people who mean to be their
own governors, must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives. A popular government without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to
a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps both." Statement of James Madison, chairman of committee which drafted the First Amendment, quoted in LASSWELL, NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INDIVIDUAL FREDOM 62 (1950). Lasswell also is keenly aware of the importance to
popular government of an informed public. Id. at 154. See also, REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS (1947); stating: "If the people are to govern
themselves, their only hope of doing so wisely lies ,in the collective wisdom derived
from the fullest possible information and in the fair presentation of differing opinions."
Id. at 47.
10. "If government is the instrument which they [society] adopted for the promotion of general good; if it is the creature which they invested with powers for
effecting the benevolent design of social felicity, it is society which must determine
whether these purposes have been realized, or how far they have been departed from.
It follows, therefore, as a necessary consequence, that the government which attempts
to coerce the progress of opinion, or abolish the freedom of investigation into political
affairs, materially violates the most essential principles of the social state. . . ." WORTMXAN,
TREATISE CONCERNING POLITICAL INQUIRY AND LIBERTY OF THE PRESS (1800), quoted
in SCHROEDER, FREE PRESS ANTHOLOGY 36 (1909).

Other early writers expressed concern over the importance of ascertaining the
truth about governmental activities: "A sound and healthy state of public feeling
depends everywhere upon the healthy state of public information .... CooPER, LIBERTY
OF THE PRESS (1830), quoted in .ScHROEDER, op. cit. supra, at 42. "The whole strength
and value, then, of human judgment, depending on the one property, that it can be set
right when it is wrong, reliance can be placed on it only when the means of setting it
right are kept constantly at hand." MILL, AN ESSAY ON LIBERTY (1859), quoted in
SCHROEDER op. cit. supra at 48. "If a people are to be in a position to judge the
conduct of their government, to decide whether it is doing well or ill, to decide the
merits of public policy at all; if, indeed, they are to preserve the bapacity for sound
judgment, they must have facts before them not only as the government would have
them put, but also as those who disagree with the government may desire to put them."
ANGELL, THE PRESS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF SocIETY 17 (1922).
A modern authority on First Amendment freedoms observes: "Freedom protects
us from those in power. By and large, worse calamities would result if those in power
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which professes self-government lies in' the fact that without one the
other cannot truly exist.
It is not enough merely to recognize the important political justification
for freedom of information. Citizens of a self-governing society must
possess the legal right to examine and investigate the conduct of its
affairs, subject only to those limitations imposed by the most urgent
public necessity. This right must be elevated to a position of highest
sanctity if it is to constitute an effective bulwark against unresponsive
leadership.
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law
or speech. .. ." Admittedly, it con... abridging freedom of the press ..
tains no explicit guarantee of freedom of information; but this language,
in the abstract, does not supply the ultimate criterion determining the
rights protected. There is convincing evidence that the drafters of the Bill
of Rights were aware of the vital need to keep the people informed of
official operations. This realization was one of the considerations motivating the guarantees of free speech and press. Implicit in both is the right
to know what the government is doing. Madison emphasized this soon
after the adoption of the First Amendment in a discussion of its implications : ". . . the right of freely examining public characters and measures,
and of free communication thereon, is the only effectual guardian of
every other right. . . .""' Judge Cooley, in his influential treatise, lends
support to this interpretation of Constitutional history, 1 2 i.e., that the
First Amendment sanction was accorded not only to dissemination, but
also to acquisition of information. 1 3
at the moment could manage affairs without having their conduct and policies subjected
to a thorough-going review." CHAFEE, op. cit. szipra note 8, at 41.
11. 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 398 (1906). Thomas Jefferson, realizing the
importance of an informed public, said: "The basis of our governments being the
opinion of the people, the very first object should be to keep that right. The way to
prevent [errors of] the people, is to give them full information of their affairs through
the channel of the public papers, and to contrive that these papers should penetrate the
whole mass of the people." Quoted in LASSwELL, op. cit. supra note 9, at 62.
-12. "To guard against repressive measures by the several departments of the
government by means of which persons in power might secure themselves and favorites
from just scrutiny and condemnation, was the general purpose. The evils to be
prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public
matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise
of their rights as citizens." 2

THOMAS M. COOLEY,

CONSTITUTIONAL LI.".ITATIONS

885,

886 (8th ed. 1927).
13. The framers had good cause for concern over preservation of a free press.
For more than a century prior to the adoption of the Bill of Rights, history discloses
a persistent effort on the part of the British Crown to prevent any criticism of its
operation, regardless of its truth. The means adopted was the imposition of previous
restraints upon the press, first-by requiring all printed matter to be licensed and later
by a tax on newspapers. The history of the struggle for freedom of speech and press
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Public officials who prefer to remain unaccountable for their actions
recognize their inability to prevent the publication of facts once they
have been obtained. Thus, their efforts are directed to keeping the facts
from the press initially. In many cases, a vigilant press has frustrated
-surreptitious governmental activities, but the right to know about official
conduct is too fundamental to be entrusted solely to the fortuitous sanction of adverse publicity.' 4 The-courts no longer can tacitly assume that
access to information is being uniformly permitted, in view of multiplying
instances of arbitrary concealment. Instead they must expressly accord
the same constitutional recognition to acquisition as they have to the dissemination of facts. To reject this indispensable complement of free
in the American colonies closely paralleled that of England. Influenced by these encroachments, early statesmen were anxious to devise means of insuring responsiveness to
the will of the people. See PATrERSON, FrE SPzcEr AND A FREE PREss cc. 1 to 17
(1939), for a detailed discussion of the struggle in England over freedom of expression. See also HocKING, FREEDOm OF THE PREss: A FRAMEWdRK OF PRINCIPLE

3 et seq. (1947).
The First Amendment granted a much broader freedom of the press than existed in
England at the time. The English law forbade only previous restraint, but "this idea
of the freedom of the press can never be admitted to be the American idea of it, since
a law inflicting penalties on printed publications would have a similar effect with a
law authorizing a previous restraint on them." MADisON, op. cit. spra note 11, at 386.
Madison explains the difference in the fact that Parliament is omnipotent, but in
the United States "[t]he People, not the goverment, possess the absolute sovereignty....
Hence, in the United States the great and essential rights of the people are secured
against legislative as well as against executive ambition." Id. at 386, 387.
14. The police commission of Norwich, Connecticut, decided to close its records
to the public. After publicity in the Norwich Bulletin, the commissioners removed the
blackout. In Maysville, Kentucky, a county clerk closed his records on civil suits to
the editor of the Daily Independent. A front page story of the suppression and a
protest wire from the American Society of Newspaper Editors Committee on Freedom
of Information induced the clerk to rescind his order. Collaboration between a naval
officer and a sheriff resulted in seizure of a picture of a plane crash on a public highway
in Barger, Texas. The newspaper ran a blank space where the picture would have
been and it was promptly returned. After the police chief in Peoria, Illinois, refused
to allow the journal to see police records affecting a hospital board member, it sought
a writ of mandamus. Two of the board members resigned before the police chief
finally relented. The writ was withdrawn.
The United States Board of Parole initially refused to release to the Louisville
Courier-Journal the names of indorsers of a parole for an income tax evader. Upon
demand of a reason for such refusal, the chairman of the board released the names,
declaring, however: "In the future . . . desired information will be supplied if, in our
opinion, such information would be compatible with the welfare of society." How this
compatibility will be determined and by whom was not made clear. The school board
in Torrington, Connecticut, repeatedly denied a reporter access to its meetings and
minutes. After months of secrecy, court action forced the minutes out of seclusion.
The Standard-Times in New Bedford, Massachusetts, after two years, gained the right
to attend school board sessions. The Freeport Press obtained access to Freeport, Maine,
school records only after initiating court action.

Communications to the
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from the American Newspaper

Publishers Association; Freedom of Information Committee of the American Society
of Newspaper Editors; the Charleston, West Virginia, Gazette; and The Maine
Journalist.
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speech and press is not only to underestimate the wisdom of the architects
of the Bill of Rights but also to deny an effective safeguard of responsive
government.

II.
Too often has access to information been denied on the ground that
it would not be "for the public good" to have the facts disclosed. Under
this plea, dictatorial governments have succeeded in completely suppressing all freedom of information, thereby rendering the press and the
people servile tools of their ambitions. In a garrison state thought control
is of primary importance. Just as secrecy and democracy are incompatible, so totalitarianism and an informed public cannot coexist. As the
preeminent propagandist has succinctly described the Nazi program of
indoctrination, "We no longer want the formation of public opinion,
but rather the public formation of opinion."' 5 As a means to that end,
Herr Goebbels masterminded the Reich Chamber of Culture, an allembracing, government-controlled organization which policed every possible approach to the German mind, from the daily newspaper to the art
gallery. The obvious result of such systematized oppression was that the
German people were told not what they were entitled to know, but what
their leaders wanted them to know. 1 6
A more recent example of the natural resistance of dictatorships
to an informed public was the Peron government's seizure of La Prensa.
Its editor-publisher, Alberto Gainza Paz, who was banished for refusal to
submit to the dictates of official censors, entertains no doubt as to the
extreme importance of freedom of information. 1 7 Those who com 15. Quotation from Goebbels in CIHAFEE, op. cit. szopra note 8, at 22.
16. See BRUcKER, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION 223 et seq. (1949), for a more complete picture of thought control in Germany. Mussolini employed a similar scheme. The
editor of every newspaper had to be approved by the prefect, who had authority to
prevent publication of any news which was embarrassing to the government. PATTERSON, op. cit. supra note 13, at 26.

17. "The first act of any dictatorship is to suppress freedom of information. If
they can't make a frontal attack against the press, they try by insidious ways to capture
and restrict that freedom of information. Then they try to create through governmentcontrolled means, radio, newspapers, pamphlets, a unanimous line of thought by feeding
the people what they want the people to know ... The result they hope for is only
The only way to oppose
one opinion, one thought, one knowledge in the country ...
those evil forces is to defend freedom of information. . . . That defense should not
be confined to newspapermen only . . . the public, the people must realize that it is a

matter of vital importance for them." Paz, 17 Northwestern University Reviewing
Stand 6 (Sept. 30, 1951).
See also, LIPPMAN, LIBERTY

AND THE NEws (1920), where it is stated: "Men who
have lost their grip upon the relevant facts of their environment are the inevitable

victims of agitation and propaganda. The quack, the charlatan, the jingo, and the
terrorist can flourish only where the audience is deprived of independent access to

informaion." Id. at 54.

NOTES
placently shrug off the La Prensa episode with the observation that "it
could never happen here" should be reminded that while Hitler shocked
the entire civilized world by burning thousands of books in 1933, Ameri8
can cities were quietly banning dozens of them from their newsstands.'
A positive danger lies in the realization that a totalitarian state makes
no pretense; it suppresses the facts and admits that it does so. Withholding of information in a democracy conceals the very fact that suppression is taking place. 9 The numerous instances of governmental
secrecy may seem inconsequential; they will appear so only if the right to
20
know is confused with less fundamental liberties.

III
While few would deny that an informed populace is essential to
effective self-government, the means of achieving this end are the subject
of much disagreement. The same controversy rages as to the appropriate
limits of judicial intercession in behalf of established First Amendment
guarantees. Illustrative of the view which would restrict the judicial
prerogative is a recent analysis of the Supreme Court's function in the
free speech cases . 2 The author's position is that the qualification "except
as may be necessary" must be appended to the language of the First
Amendment. 2 2 He proceeds to reason that Congress, not the courts, is
the proper agency to determine this necessity. The courts' appropriate
function, even in civil liberties cases, is limited; they should defer to
24
a legislative judgement 23 despite their conviction as to its unwisdom.
18. Small, What Censorship Keeps You From Knowing, Redbook Magazine, July,
1951, reprinted in AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERns PAMPHLET No. 45 (1951).
19. As an example, the Atomic Energy Commission, in 1948, made an apparently
routine announcement that all the members of the AEC Personnel Security Review
Board had resigned. The board had actually resigned during the summer because of
dissatisfaction with certain Commission actions. What was not revealed was that the
announcement of the Board's resignation would have been withheld indefinitely but for
the fact that a committee of scientists had arranged to confer with the Commission about
security procedures. Thus, "secrecy may be a device to conceal ignorance and error as
well as knowledge and success." GELLITOR', SECURITY, LOYALTY, AND SCIENCE 50 (1950).
20. Although no one would contend totalitarianism presents an immediate threat
to representative government in the United States, how long this system can survive
once the precedent of arbitrary restrictions on information has become firmly entrenched is a matter of concern. See CHrAFEE, op. cit. supra note 8, at 10. See also,
GELLHORN, op. cit. supra note 19, where the author discusses this problem.
21. Richardson, Freedom of Expression and the Function of Courts, 65 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1951).
22. Id. at 50.
23. Even as to legislative findings of facts! For example, Congress might enact
legislation forbidding inclusion of the teachings of Karl Marx in college curricula on
the ground that it presents a clear and present danger to national security. Under this
theory the courts must defer to such a legislation finding.
24. "A more convincing justification for refusal to extend deference to legislative
judgments touching freedom of iitterance . . . springs from an awareness that these
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The writer indicates his substitute for reliance on the judiciary to protect
basic rights as follows: "The great battles for free expression will be
"won, if they are won, not in the courts but in committee
rooms and
protest meetings, by editorials and letters to Congress, and through the
courage of citizens everywhere. The proper function of courts is narrow."2' 5 This statement overlooks the fact that those who are forced to
"battle" for the right to free expression in reality have little power
over Congress or the press. It is not the right to express majority
opinions that needs protection. Rather, it is "freedom for the thought
we hate" which requires the aid of the judicial process.
The perspective purporting to rest upon "courage of citizens everywhere" and the impropriety of allowing "undemocratic institutions . ..
to govern ' 26 is even less persuasive as applied to freedom of information. 27 Those who maintain that the public's interest in knowing the
activities of its government officials is adequately safeguarded by a
vigilant press and aroused public opinion overlook the fact that official
suppression itself is often effectively concealed. 28 Even assuming the
people are cognizant of official reticence, the remedy at the polls is an
freedoms are vital to the democratic process. . . . [TJhis being so, the courts must
undertake the responsibility of correction." But Richardson answers: "The difficulty
with this position is that it assumes that the Constitution compels the correction of
unwisdom. But if a law is not so unwise-if, in other words, the competing considerations that have been resolved by its enactment have not been so arbitrarily resolved
and if the inferences from the data upon which it rests have not been so irrationally
drawn-that its provisions fall outside the area of reasonable judgment, a court in
overturning it would be obeying not the command of the Constitution but its personal
appraisal of what is wise." Richardson, supra note 21, at 50. But see CuRTIs, LioNs
UNDER THE THRONE

327-330 (1947) : "Where the democratic process is not working and

the statute is not its result, the Court is free to make up its own mind without the
exercise of any self-restraint." And, ". . . license becomes a virtue when the legislature
attacks the very process itself, as it does when it restricts the right to vote, prohibits
peaceable assembly, interferes with political organizations, restrains the dissemination
of information. . . . [Then] the court should exercise less than no restraint." And if
the purpose of securing personal rights "is to protect the democratic process against
itself, even to do that we must appeal to something outside it. When we say that these
personal rights are essential and basic to the democratic process, we are implying that
they rest on something other than that process. When we are saving that process from
itself, we must have something other than itself to save it with." Id. at 330.
25. Richardson, supra note 21, at 54.
26. Ibid. Compare CURTIS, op. cit. supra note 24, at 324. The courts are an undemocratic, "though integral part of our democratic 'process."
27. HocKiNG,,op. cit. supra note 13, at 170: "We say recklessly that readers or
listeners have a 'right to know', yet it is a right which they are helpless to claim, for
they do not know that they have the right to know what as yet they do not know."
Congress itself is not fully informed. Witness the remarks of Senator Brien McMahon,
concerning the secrecy of atomic production figures; he suggests that the United States
is jeopardizing the fundamental principles of representative government because Congress,
being uninformed, "lacks sufficient knowledge upon which to discharge its own Constitutional duties." GELLHORN, op. cit. supra note 19, at 10.
28. For a vivid example of concealed concealment, see note 19 supra.

NOTES
impotent one. How, for example, could the electors of Elkton, Maryland,
arrive at an intelligent decision as to which councilmen to re-elect when
they had no way of knowing how and why those officials voted on specific
issues, since the meetings were closed to press and public ?29 In addition,
the seclusion of facts may be justified; hence political censure may not
be warranted in every instance of nondisclosure. Until freedom of
information is accorded constitutional stature, there is no adequate
criterion with which to evaluate official silence. A moral standard is not
sufficient.
Another disadvantage in placing implicit faith in the dembcratic
processes is that those officials least responsive to the public will are most
likely to attempt to insulate their conduct from scrutiny: The elective
mechanism is too blunt an instrument to have much impact on an official
far down in the administrative hierarchy. The most pronounced fallacy
of those placing complete reliance in the political apparatus is their failure
to perceive the effect of national emergency on the willingness of the
people to relinquish their liberties."0 The existence of a free society
demands that regulation of freedom of expression be withdrawn to a
large extent from the legislative and executive processes ;31 so also protection of the right to be informed of governmental activities falls within
32
the special competency of the judiciary.
IV
It is inaccurate to assume that express legal recognition of freedom
of information would introduce a doctrine entirely unprecedented in our
29. See note 4 supra. That the real value of the right to vote is dependent upon
adequate information pertaining to a candidate's worth was recognized at the dawn
of our national history: ". . . the right of electing the members of the Government
constitutes more particularly the essence of a free and responsible government. The
value and efficacy of this right depends upon the knowledge of the comparative merits
and demerits of the candidates for public trust and on the equal freedom, consequently,
of examining and discussing these merits and demerits of the candidates respectively."
MADISON, op. cit. supra note 11, at 397.
30. In his book dealing with the problem of maintaining the correct balance between the nation's security and the individual's freedom in the present crisis, Lasswell
points out that: "An insidious outcome of continuing crisis is the tendency to slide
into a new conception of normality that takes vastly extended controls for granted
and thinks of freedom in smaller and smaller dimensions." LAsswL.L, op. cit. supra
note 9, at 29.
31. See Mann, Book Review, 25 IND. L.J. 389 (1950).
32. In the words of Mr. Justice Jackson: "The very pmrpose of a Bill of Rights is
to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free
speech and free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights
may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
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legal system. This error is exposed by critical analysis of the rationale
often employed to uphold the right freely to disseminate ideas. In the
Minnesota Gag Law Case,33 the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a
statute which sanctioned suppression of information by providing for
injunction against its publication. While admittedly this case is one
sustaining freedom of dissemination against the threat of previous restraint, Chief justice Hughes indicates that the interest to which the court
defers is not primarily that of the newspaper to dispense the news but
rather that of the public to acquire it.34 Although clearly the vehicle
through which the Court furthers this interest is not unique, the principle
underlying the opinion is one which was regarded with great esteem by
those who participated in the formulationi of the Bill of Rights. As will
be demonstrated in an examination of First Amendment cases, judicial
solicitude for'a well informed citizenry has been by no means infrequent.
Viewed in this perspective, the novelty of the thesis here proposed
lies in the suggested means of advancing a frequently recognized interest,
i.e., that the public be accorded a legally enforceable right to compel
divulgence of information by recalcitrant officials. It will be recalled
that Madison frequently emphasized the importance of the intei-est itself
and in no way proscribed the "remedies" for achieving it.3 5 Nor does
a literal reading of the free press Amendment inexoiably foreclose the
contention that compulsory disclosure of official activities is a legitimate
means of reaching the end embodied in the Constitution. That a less
drastic method has been reasonably effective in the past should not now
prevent reliance on the only remaining practicable safeguard of this
fundamental interest. Having recognized the significance of the public's
right to secure facts about their government, surely the Framers should
not be subjected to the gratuitous imputation that they intended to deny
its effective implementation.
Some will contend that, although the Framers postulated a broad
right, they perceived the need for, and hence contemplated, only a very
33. Near v. Minnesota. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
34. "Charges of reprehensible conduct, and in particular of official malfeasance,
unquestionably create a public scandal, but the theory of the constitutional guaranty
is that even a more serious public evil would be caused by auihority to prevent publication." Id. at 722 (emphasis added).
35. See note 11 supra, and accompanying text. It should be recognized that the
driving force behind the First Amendment was primarily the desire to check possible
abuses of government by preserving an untrammeled press, rather than any solicitude
for the inherent right of the individual to assert his views. That the former was
uppermost in the minds of the framers is indicated by the fact that state constitutions
of that era protected only freedom of the press and by Madison's failure to include
free speech in his proposal to the drafting Committee. See discussions in CURTIS, op.
cit. supra note 24, at 267-269; and PATTERSON, op. cit. supra note. 13, at 118-122.
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limited remedy. However, it does not follow that the sole means now
adequate to secure this interest is unavailable. That the Constitution is
a dynamic instrument to be interpreted in light of present conditions
needs no demonstration. To the originators of our Constitution, who
contemplated an administrative hierarchy no larger than a medium-sized
corporation of today, it may have appeared sufficient to entrust this
fundamental right to the ability of the press to ferret out the facts and
convey them to the public. That this reliance is no longer feasible is
becoming increasingly apparent.
Five years after the Gag Law Case, the Supreme Court struck down
another form of previous restraint upon publication when it held unconstitutional a license tax on the privilege of engaging in the newspaper
business. 30 The levy was characterized a "deliberate and calculated device
in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the
public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties.' 37 Here again
the Supreme Court demonstrated its awareness of the necessity of an
informed public in a democratic society and was not primarily interested
in the right of the press, for its own sake, to circulate information.
Another line of cases involving First Amendment freedoms which
manifests judicial concern for the right of the people to acquire the facts
deals with constructive contempt. These decisions are doubly significant
since the courts were confronted with the necessity of reconciling two
frequently conflicting constitutional principles. The Supreme Court has
taken the position that contempt proceedings may be used to restrict the
exercise of rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
only when such exercise creates a clear and present danger to the fair
3"
administration of justice.3" And in Pennekamp v. State of Florida,
the Supreme Court reversed a conviction of constructive contempt,
although recognizing that in criticizing the prosecution of justice in
certain pending cases the defendant had distorted the truth. Mr. Justice
Reed declared for the majority that the evil consequence of comment
36. Grosjean v. American Press, 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936). "The predominant purpose of the grant of immunity here invoked was to preserve an untrammeled press as
a vital source of public information . . . since informed public'opinion is the most
potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of the
publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern."

37. Ibid.
38. Bridges v. State of California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941). Justice Black, speaking
for the majority, admitted that legal trials are unlike elections to be won through
the use of the meeting hall, the radio, and the newspaper, but pointed out that the
court cannot assume that to preserve judicial impartiality, it is necessary for judges to
have a contempt power by which they can close all channels of public expression
bearing upon pending cases.
39. 328 U.S. 331 (1946).
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must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high
' 40
before utterances can be punished.
In another constructive contempt case, the Court reversed a Texas
decision subordinating a free press to fair administration of justice. 41
The defendants had characterized a tribunal's action in a particular case
as a "gross miscarriage of justice." The Supreme Court held that, inasmuch as a trial is a public event, what takes place in the courtroom is
public property and may be reported with impunity. This was true
despite the fact that the editorials were biased and did not reflect com42
petent reporting.
In the constructive contempt cases judicial preoccupation with the
public's interest in procuring facts illustrates the lengths to which the
courts are willing to go in subordinating the unobstructed administration
of justice to freedom of information. Certainly it cannot be contended
that the right to know what public officials are doing extends only to
judicial officers. Even more essential to the democratic processes is a
thorough knowledge of executive and legislative activities.
If further evidence of judicial awareness of the people's right to
be informed is necessary, it is provided by a significant antitrust case
involving an international newsgathering agency. The Government,
alarmed over the steadily growing newspaper monopolies, contended that
restricting access to information possessed by the Associated Press, in
order to protect its members from competition, violated the Sherman Act.
Judge Learned Hand, in granting an injunction against this practice.
manifested great concern over the adverse effect of the challenged ar43
The Supreme Court affirmed, 44
rangement on an informed public.
40. Id. at 334. In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter remarked: "Without
a free press there can be no free society. Freedom of the press, however, is not an end
in itself but a means to the end of a free society." Id. at 354, 355.
41. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947).
42. "There is no special requisite of the judiciary which enables it, as distinguished
from other institutions of democratic government, to suppress, edit, or censor events
which transpire in proceedings before it." Id. at 374. See also Sullens v. State. 4 So.2d.
356, 363 (1941), "It is not a postulate of democracy that the truth shall make men free;
rather it is the right to know the truth that keeps them so. Thus courts become one of
the means to the end that such rights may be protected."
43. In U.S. v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362 (S.D. N.Y. 1943), it was stated:
. neither exclusively, nor even primarily, are the interests of the newspaper industry conclusive; for that industry serves one of the most vital of all general
interests; the dissemination of news from as many different sources, and with as
many different facets and colors as is possible. That interest is closely akin to, if indeed
it is not the same as, the interest protected by the First Amendment; it presupposes
that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues,
than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be,
folly; but we have staked upon it our all." Id. at 372.
44. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). Justice Black speaking
for the majority declared: "It would be strange indeed however if the grave concern

observing that the First Amendment prohibition against governmental
interference with a free press,does not sanction repression of that freedom
by private interests. In this case the Court not only recognized the public
interest in being informed, but also condoned a type of compulsory
disclosure at the instance of the Antitrust Division. 45

Of utmost

significance is the fact that the party whose suppression was condemned
was a private newsgathering agency, not a government official. Arbitrary
governmental suppression of facts presents an even greater justification
for judicial intervention. When the government refuses to divulge information, not only are the facts not presented by a "multitude of
tongues," they are not presented at all.
A recent district court case explicitly recognized the right of a newspaper to compel disclosure of information suppressed by a city council. 46 In
1947, the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, granted certain citizens tax
cancellations and abatements. Repeated efforts of a reporter for the
Providence Journal to gain access to the records for publication were
unsuccessful. Various city officials who were approached made no effort
to justify their refusal to allow examination. The data were subsequently
furnished to another local newspaper, after which the council passed an
ordinance conditioning inspection of such documents upon its approval.
In an action to enforce its right to inspect these records, the Providence
Journal alleged that defendants' conduct violated its constitutional
rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court granted
the relief requested, holding that the lists were public records and that
the officials' actions were so arbitrary and capricious as to deny the
plaintiff the equal protection of the laws. As an alternative ground for
its decision the court added: "Where such records as these are public
records and where there is no reasonable basis for restricting their examination and publication, the attempt here to prohibit their publication is
an abridgment of freedom of speech and of the press. They seek to
place in the discretion of the city council the granting or denial of a constitutional right.

'4 7

On appeal, the First Circuit emphasized the denial of equal protection and affirmed without mention of the lower court's unique dictum
for freedom of the press which prompted adoption for the First Amendment should

be read as a command that the government was without power to protect that freedom.
. . . [T]hat Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination
of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of
the public, that a free press is a condition of a free society." Id at 20.
45. See Marcus, Antitrust Laws and the Right to Kntow, 24 IND. L.J. 513 (1949),

for a development of the thesis that a right to information is a legitimate concern of
the antitrust laws.

46. Providence Journal Co. v. McCoy, 94 F. Supp. 186 (1950).
47. Id. at 195, 196.,
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recognizing the constitutional right of the press to require officials to
make public withheld information. 48 The council's partiality unfortunately prevented a clear test of the constitutional right to demand revelation of information pertaining to government affairs.
While a number of First Amendment cases have reiterated the importance of a well-informed electorate to representative government, none
p roffered the only adequate means of attaining this end in the face of
official resistance. But courts and legislatures which have recognized
similar interests of lesser stature have not been so reluctant to provide the
means for their realization. In most jurisdictions a limited common law
or statutory right of access to public records is recognized. 40 The prevalent rule permits access to such documents upon proof that the intended
examination is in the interests of society. 50 The right is commonly
limited to public records, technically defined as those legally required to
be kept or necessary to the discharge of a duty imposed by law. In a
leading case,5 1 the auditor general of Michigan refused to allow a news
reporter to inspect records pertaining to expenditures of public money
on the ground that there was no legitimate public interest in the documents and the reporter had demonstrated no special interest. The newspaper successfully mandated the auditor general onl the theory that the
common law rule grants the right of inspection. The public interest in
official books and records was explicitly sustained. 52
Though the Michigan decision may provide some impetus to official
responsibility, the common law rule allowing inspection of records is a
palpably inadequate safeguard. The pattern of judicial treatment of this
right has been characterized by seeming indifference. Occasionally, the
official successfully contends that the matters of record would tend to
degrade the parties or injure public morals. 53 Denial frequently has been
predicated on the claim that encouragement of public inquiry would
unduly burden administrative machinery. 54 More often, the apology is
48. 190 F.2d 760 (1951).
49. See SEIBERT. THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE PRESS (1934) passim, for
a comprehensive study of public records problems in relation to the press.
50. Id. at 19.
51. Nowack v. Fuller, 243 Mich. 200, 219 N.W. 749 (1928).
52. Any rule to the contrary, the court said, ". . . is repugnant to the spirit of our
democratic institutions. Ours is a government of the people. Every citizen rules ....
He
[the auditor general] is their servant. His official books and records are theirs. . . . It
would be a great surprise to the citizens . . . to learn that the law denied them access
to their own books, for the purpose of seeking how their money was being expended
and how their business was being conducted." Id. at 219, N.W. at 750.
53. Payne v. Staunton, 55 W.Va. 202, 46 S.E. 927 (1904).
54. Randolph v. State, exr. rel. Collier, 82 Ala. 527, 2 So. 714 (1887); Cormack v.
Wolcott, 37 Kan. 391, 15 Pac. 45 (1887).
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that the records sought are not "strictly public." 55 That the facts most
essential to the preservation of official integrity never become matters
of ptublic record, however, is the predominant reason why the efficacy
of the common law right of inspection should not be overemphasized. A
more basic deficiency has reference to the transient riature of legislative
pronouncements. So fundamental a right should tianscend the fluctuations of the political environment.
The right to inspect the records of federal departments is even more
nebulous and far less heartening to proponents of accountability in government. The legal authority of these agencies to restrict access to
their files, so far as it exists, is derived from a general "housekeeping"
statute, which authorizes department heads to "prescribe regulatiois...
not inconsistent with law. . . ." for the management of their departments. 56 Blanket regulations promulgated under this enactrient, such as
Department of Justice Order No. 2339, forbid production of agency files
by subordinates.5 7 Unforunately, they have been invoked indiscriminately
to clothe agency documents with a sanctity frequently unwarranted by the
nature of the information withheld. 58 The potentiality of this statute as
an instrument of suppression in the hands of administrative officials was
early demonstrated. A San Francisco newspaper requested permission
to examine files of executive departments to ascertain the identity of those
recommended for government positions by two California Congressmen.
The Administrators, having requested an advisory opinion, were informed by the Attorney General that they were authorized by regulations
issued under the "housekeeping" statute to deny access to the files involved. Compliance with the newspaper's request would impose an
55. State ex. reL Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hunter, 127 W.Va. 738, 34 S.E.2d
468 (1945); People ex. rel. Stenstrom v. Harnett, 226 N.Y.S. 338 (Sup. Ct 1927).
56. 1 STAT. 28 (1789), 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1946) : Departmental Regulations: The head
of each department is authorized to prescribe regulations, not inconsistent with law, for
the government of his department, the conduct of its officers and clerks, the distribution
and performance of its business, and the custody, use, and preservation of the records,
papers, and property appertaining to it
57. "General rule as to non-availability of Department of Justice records. All
official files, documents, records and information in the offices of the Department
,of Justice . . . or in the custody or control of any officer or employee of the
Department of Justice are to be regarded as confidential. No officer or employee
may permit the disclosure or use of the same . . . except in the discretion of the
Attorney General. . . . Whenever a subpoena duces tecum is served to produce any
such files, documents, records or information, the officer or employee on whom such
subpoena is served, unless otherwise directed by the Attorney General, will appear in
court in answer thereto and respectfully decline to produce the records specified therein,
on the ground that disclosure of such records is prohibited by this regulation."
58. See Berger and Krash, Government Inzniunity From Discovery, 59 Yale L.J.
1451 (1950). The article discusses the difficulty faced by litigants attempting to obtain
information from government files, because of the excessive reliance by government
on departmental regulations like that of the Justice Department.
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onerous burden on the department. The relaxation of legislative responsibility encouraged by this ruling is emphasized by the fact that the data
were sought to establish that the Congressmen had recommended improper persons for government positions.59
Most frequent resort to this statute has been for the purpose of
thwarting efforts of private litigants to introduce, as evidence in judicial
tribunals, materials contained in official files. 60 The insulation afforded
agency documents by administrative regulations pursuant to the act has
far exceeded the proper bounds of "official" and "state secrets," to the
serious detriment of fair administration of justice. 6 ' The doctrine of
immunity from process of department heads, 62 coupled with recognition
of judicial impotence to compel subordinate officials to disobey dictates
of their superiors,6 3 has facilitated agency reliance on non-di~closure
regulations and impeded judicial determination of the scope of the
statutory privilege, if any, authorized by the act. Where Government is
a party to the litigation the courts have adroitly circumvented these obstacles by imposition of indirect inducements to disclosure.6 4 However,
the plight of the litigant in a private action, whose case depends on evidence obtainable only from government files, is a serious one.
The key to rational construction of the act, compromising the rights
of private litigants with the policies underlying the privileged character
of official and state secrets, lies in the phrase "not inconsistent with
law.""
A recent case, 66 distinguishing language in Boske v. Commn67
gore, which has been the touchstone of non-susceptibility of department
heads to compulsory process, has removed the chief barrier to interpreta59. 15 Ops ATT. GEN. 342 (1877).
60. Examples are: Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900); Bank of America
National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Douglas, 105 F.2d 100 (D.C. Cir. 1939); United
States v. Chadwick, 76 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Ala. 1948); United States v. Potts, 57 F.
Supp. 204 (M.D. Pa. 1944); Harwood v. McMurtry, 22 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Ky.
1938) ; Stegall v. Thurman, 175 Fed. 813 (N.D. Ga. 1910) ; In re Lamberton, 124 Fed.
446 (W.D. Ark. 1903) ; In re Weeks, 82 Fed. 729 (D. Vt. 1897); In re Hirsch, 74
Fed. 928 (D. Conn. 1896) ; It re Huttman, 70 Fed. 699 (D. Kan. 1895) ; Fowkes v.
Dravo Corp., 5 F.R.D. 51 (E.D. Pa. 1945); U.S. v. Schine Chain Theatres, 4 F.R.D. 108
(W.D. N.Y. 1944); Walling v. Cometcarriers, 3 F.R.D. 442 (S.D. N.Y. 1944).
61. Dean Wigmore takes the position that the courts should be the final arbiters
as to the necessity for secrecy. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2379 (3d ed. 1940).
62. Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 470 (1900). See also Note, 51 COL. L. REV.
881, 885 (1951), and authorities cited therein.
63. U.S. ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 321, 324 (7th Cir. 1950), aff'd, 340 U.S.
462 (1951), contains a discussion of authorities on this point.
64. See Note, supra note 62, at 886.
65. 1 STAT. 28 (1789), 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1946). See Berger and Krash, supra note
58, at 1460-61.
66. U.S. ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 321 (7th Cir. 1950).
67. 177 U.S. 459 (1900).
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tion of the act. 68 Critics of this suppression of evidence under the authority of blanket statutory privilege have indicated the considerations which
should be influential in determining the meaning of the provision. The
statute was calculated merely to enable officials to provide for internal
administration of their agencies. 69 The Federal Rules relating to discovery have the force of law. Hence, administrative rulings purporting
to rest upon authority of the housekeeping statute cannot create a privilege inconsistent with these rules.70 The common law privilege accorded
to state and official secrets also imposes limits on the scope of such rulings.7 1 Future decisions should achieve a more acceptable accommodation
of the public interest in access to information in the hands of government
officials, the exigencies of national security, and feasible division of functions among the agencies of government.
A purely common law example of judicial cognizance of society's
interest in obtaining official information is the "public figures" exception
to the right of privacy. Since the famous Brandeis-Warren collaboration
in 1890,72 legal rdcognition has been accorded to the individual's desire

to withdraw his personal affairs from general scrutiny. However, this
tribute to the individual's reluctance to be subjected to publicity from
the outset has been subservient to the public interest in acquiring information of general significance. In Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance
Company, the court remarked: "One who holds public office ... [subjects his life] at all times to the closest scrutiny in order to determine
whether the rights of the public are safe in his hands ....

[T] he law

considers that the welfare of the public is better served by maintaining
the liberty of speech and of the press than by allowing an individual to
assert his right of privacy in such a way as to interfere with . ..the

publication of every matter in which the public may be legitimately interested."' 73 If a governmental officer's private affairs become the legitimate target of idle curiosity, his official life is a matter of even greater
public concern.
Another prominent current recognition of the import of unrestrained
access to information is that embodied in the Freedom of Information
68. See Note, supra note 62, at 887, in which the author suggests that the recent
case of Land v. Dollar, 190 F.2d 366 (D.C. Cir. 1951), citing the Secretary of Commerce for contempt, further indicates that agency heads are amenable to compulsory
process.
69. Berger and Krash, supra note 58, at 1460, n.50.

70. Id. at 1454-55.
71. -In this connection, see Note, 58 YALE L.J. 993, 996 (1949).
72. Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. Rzv. 193, 214 (1890).
The first limitation recognized by the authors was: "The right to privacy does not
prohibit any publication of matter which is of public or general interest."

73. 122 Ga. 190, 200-204, 50 S.E. 68, 72 (1905).
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Article of the United Nations proposed Declaration of Human Rights.7"
The United States has been a leading advocate of adoption of this
declaration by the General Assembly. In December of 1946, the Assembly convened the International Conference on Freedom of Information to undertake an intensive study of suppression of ideas. The U. S.
representative to the Draft Convention recently made clear to the committee his position that this fundamental principle should not be the
subject of compromise. 75 It would indeed be anomalous to loudly proclaim the universality of this right and yet deny it to our own citizens."
It doubtless is one purpose of the United Nations in attempting to secure
recognition of the right to freedom of information, to retard the growth
of totalitarian ideologies. Certainly it is equally important to the preservation of self-government in the United States to foster a similar right
to combat occasional arbitrary proclivities of government officials.
A major step toward achievement of this goal is a recent decision
of a New Jersey Superior Court. 77 This case attracted wide attention as
an initial recognition that radio is embraced within the constitutional
guarantee of free press. A radio station and a citizen-taxpayer of Asbury
Park, New Jersey, sought to restrain city officials from interfering with
the broadcast of a council meeting concerning a luxury tax ordinance. In
an oral opinion, the court granted a temporary injunction on the ground
that news broadcasting is within the definition of "press" under the New
Jersey and United States Constitutions. More important to the present
74. See 10 UNITED NATIONS BuLL. 212 (March 1, 1951).
75. "Freedom of information is the right of every person to have access to all
available facts, ideas, and opinions regardless of source and not only to the information approved by his government or his party. . . . [T]he exercise of this freedom is
the inalienable right of every person. . . . [T]his freedom belongs to that relatively
small vital area of the democratic process which must remain, as far as possible, immune
from governmental interference. This is the absolute test of democratic government.
To the extent that the exercise of this freedom is not free, no other liberty is secure."
24 DEPT. STATE BULL. 194, 195 (1951).
76. However, it should. not be inferred that the United Nations efforts are directed
toward compulsory disclosure of information. While the interest recognized by the
Draft Convention is a well-informed public, the only means to this end with which
the United Nations group have been concerned are the channels of dissemination.
The limitations incorporated in the Article have been the subject of heated debate
in the United States. For a discussion of arguments against adoption of the proposals
see Hanson, Freedom of the Press, Is it Threatened in the United Nations, 37
A.B.A.J. 417 (1951), and Holman, The Convention on Freedom of .nforlnation: A
Threat to Freedom of Speech in America, id. at 567. These writers take the position that
adoption of the proposed measures would sanction imposition of- previous restraints on
First Amendment freedoms. In direct opposition to this view is Chafee, Legal Problems
of Freedom of Information in the United Nations, 14 LAW & CONTEiP. PROB. 545
(1949). He contends that the fears that United States' ratification of the Covenant
would impinge upon First Amendment rights are unfounded.
77. Asbury Park Press, Inc. v. City of Asbury 'Park, 20 U.S.L. WEaK 2155
(October 23, 1951) (N.J. Eq., Super. Ct., Sept. 24, 1951).
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inquiry, however, is the judge's concern for the public's right to procure
information regarding official conduct: "An enlightened local citizenry
is the best offense against foreign oppressive thinking and against the
state and municipal corruption that has been revealed in our country.
The greater the light that can be shed upon public affairs the better will
our country be run by the officials who are elected or chosen to do the
work. '17 8 This decision approaches an outright acknowledgment that
freedom of information, augmented by compulsory access, comes within
the purview of the First Amendment.
V
A rigorous absolutism in asserting access to official information is
neither practicable nor desirable. It is impossible to foresee all the diverse
situations which will confront the courts. Yet it is clear that the right
to be informed occasionally must yield to other demands of a complex
democratic society. Brief mention of a few anticipated objections to
enforced access will reveal some of the pertinent considerations which
must enter into any adjustment of the conflicting interests.
Obviously'use of this basic prerequisite to a free society as an instrument of political aggrandisement and harassment of responsible public
officials should not be tolerated. But it is unlikely that a qualified right
to invade official secrecy will ultimately discourage high calibre government personnel. 79 Official renunciation of concealment in government
will, in the long run, enhance the prestige of public servants.
Nor should the right be so readily available as to encourage a
deluge of trivial applications leading to eventual breakdown of governmental machinery. That no effort ordinarily is made to suppress ,such
trivia, coupled with the fact that disappointed applicants are unlikely to
perservere in their annoyance of agency personnel unless their claims are
legitimate, suggests that the nuisance aspect of the right to access will be
minimal.
Access to information may be balanced against considerations other
than administrative convenience. Depending on the type of governmental
function involved, the necessity to disclose and justifications for nondisclosure may vary widely. For example, where judges and grand and
petit juries are concerned, the need for complete independence of judgment and freedom of debate has been promoted by attempting to insulate
78. The attorney for the radio station argued "that the whole history of
[T]his public right should transcend
democracy is to keep the public informed ....
all other interests." Asbury Park Evening Press, Sebt. 25, 1951, p. 2, col. 5.
79. See GELLHORN, op. cit. supra note 19, for a discussion of the impact of secrecy
on the recruiting of qualified personnel into security-connected undertakings.
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deliberations from all outside influences."0 Members of Congress have
been accorded the same privilege on similar grounds. While such concessions to a-legislative body are of doubtful propriety, it is unlikely that a
practice so firmly rooted in American tradition could be successfully
challenged."'
Failure to recognize that the right to compel disclosure of governmental activities will often conflict sharply with other highly valued
public interests would be unrealistic. To require proof of the justification for nondisclosure, occasionally may jeopardize the public welfare by
necessitating near-revelation of the very facts sought to be withheld.
That a problem defies perfect solution, however, -should not preclude
82
attempts to achieve the best possible answer.
Perhaps the whiskey dilution episode, previously alluded to, presents
just such a dilemma.8 3 The excuse submitted for withholding the infractions from the public was facilitation of revenue collection. Since tax
liability was doubtful, the likelihood of negotiating any settlement entailing disclosure of the violators' identity was slight. Hence, secret compromise was deemed expedient to avoid the delay and expense attendant
upon litigation of uncertain outcome. The question is whether efficient
collection of revenue is of such paramount national importance as to
override the public interest in knowledge of governmental affairs. Only
where the highest vindication can be exhibited should suppressive activi80. The policy supporting the privilege of secret jury deliberations was explained
by Mr. Justice Cardozo in Clark v. United States, 289 U. S. 1 (1932): "Freedom of
debate might be stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors were made to
feel that their arguments and ballots were to be freely published to the world." Id. at 13.
"In the United States the executive Magistrates are not held to be infallible,
nor the Legislatures to be omnipotent; and both being elective, are both responsible.
Is it not natural and necessary, under such different circumstances, that a different
degree of freedom in the use of the press should be contemplated?" MADISON, Op. cit.
szpra note 11, at 388.
81. The Constitutional Convention of 1787 convened in secrecy. Its deliberations
were not made public until its task was near completion. See PATrERSON, op. cit. Vipra
note 13, at 116. For an historical development of the right to report legislative sessions
in the United States see SIEBERT, op. cit. supra note 49.
82. Problems defying perfect solution are not unique in our legal system. For
example, in a criminal case in which defendant was convicted for contempt because
he refused to answer questions of the grand jury on the claim of privilege against
self-incrimination, Judge Learned Hand posed such a problem: "Obviously a witness
may not be compelled to do more than show that the answer is likely to be dangerous
to him, else he will be forced to disclose those very facts which the privilege protects.
Logically, indeed, he is boxed in a paradox, for he must prove the criminatory character of what it is his privilege to suppress just because it is criminatory. The only
practicable solution is to be content with the door's being set a little ajar, and while at
times this no doubt partially destroys the privilege, and at times it permits the suppression of competent evidence,' nothing better is available." U.S. v. Weisman, 111
F.2d 261, 262 (2d Cir. 1940).
83. See note 2 supra, and accompanying text.
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ties be condoned. Often judicial ingenuity will devise means of keeping
intact the people's right to know without completely obliterating the interest sought to be protected by concealment. Perhaps the court might find
that the interest in requiring disclosure is adequately served without revealing the identities of offenders, by publication of the fact that such
compromises have been effected. The people, cognizant of the practice,
may then seek to obviate it by political means if they desire its discontinuance.
Greatest opposition to legal recognition of the right to information
is embodied in the commonly accepted dogma that national defense
efforts sanctify official reticence of every variety. While national security
does necessitate certain inroads upon democratic prerogatives, frank
realization that the present emergency is not a transient one should
render the public increasingly solicitous of its most fundamental civil
liberties.8 4 Mere mention of the magic phrase "national security" should
not automatically close all avenues of public enlightenment regarding the
conduct of government.8 5 Professor Chafee has admonished: "Freedom
84. See LASSWELL, op. cit. mpra note 9, at 75. "In a continuing crisis of national
defense the freedoms which are most vulnerable require special "igilance on the part
of everyone engaged in the review of security policies. Hence the application of four
principles deserves extra care: . . . freedom of information ... " See also, GELLxORN,
op. cit. supra note 19.
85. While still chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, David Lilienthal
warned: "We should stop this senseless business of choking ourselves by some of the
extremes of secrecy to which we have been driven, extremes of secrecy that impede
our own technical progress and our own defense." GFLLHrORN, op. cit. Vtpra note 19, at 4.
In an effort 'to prevent unauthorized disclosure of "security" information, the
President issued an Executive Order on September 24, 1951, prescribing regulations for
the executive branch in creating a .system for safeguarding official information. The
rules establish minimum standards for the classification, transmission and handling of
categorized security information. The department heads are urged not to overclassify,
and to constantly reziew their ozwt actions with a view toward downgrading the withheld
facts as soon as conditions warrant. ExEc. No. 10290, 16 FED. REG. 6413 (1951).
It is conceded that it is extremely important that matters which directly concern the
nation's defense do not inadvertently reach subversive elements. The evil inherent in
the provisions recently promulgated is that they invest the suppressing official with the
right to pass judgment on his own actions. This, coupled with the fact that many of
the departments' security activities are unavoidably intertwined with non-defense endeavors, gives rise to the possibility of secluding those facts which may only embarrass
the agency. An example of such an attempt was the order issued by the Office of Price
Stabilization instructing its employees not to make public any information that "might
cause embarrassment to the O.P.S." Fortunately, the President demanded its withdrawal
four days later. 46 AmmucAN NEWSPAER PUBLICATIONS AssocIATION FDERAL LAWS
BULL. 143 (October 5, 1951).

The directive is obyiously an outgrowth of the steady pressure of security-consciousness, but it should be remembered that "overzealousness in the cause of national
defense weakens rather than strengthens total security. Under some conditions officials
and the public at large are likely to develop a "state of nerves", of crisis impatience, that
can burst into full hysteria and encroach unnecessarily and perilously upon individugl
freedom." LdSSwELL, op. cit. suprca note 9, At 23, 24,
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makes possible the victory of long-time aims over short-time aims. One
of the main advantages of the Bill of Rights is to protect certain fundamental long-time aims from being sacrificed to short-time aims by existing
organs of government, particularly when officials are tempted to act in
response to popular excitement which will eventually be modified by
sober thinking."86 Public officials must constantly be reminded that selfgovernment is our "long-time" aim and that its accomplishment requires
a fully informed citizenry. Due to the inescapable complexity of government it is unrealistic to assume that security and non-security matters
can be neatly categorized. However, the official predicating his silence
on national security must conclusively demonstrate that the information
87
withheld bears an essential relation to the country's safety.
No attempt has been made to evolve a standard to be applied in
weighing the validity of official concealment because it is believed that
The thought
precise articulation of a rule of thumb is impossible. 8
which should remain uppermost in the public conscience in striving for
the preservation of self-government is the necessity of imbuing officials
with a sense of responsibility to communicate their doings to the people.
An enlightened citizenry is the vanguard of a democratic society.8 9
86. CHAFEE, op cit. supra note 8, at 41. "No doubt there are many matters which
ought not to be disclosed for a time, but the officials should not have a free hand to
determine what those matters are or to lock them up forever. The possession of such
a power would allow them to hoist public safety as an umbrella to cover their own
mistakes." Id. at 14.
87. See 8 WIGIAORE, EVIDENCE § 2379 (3d ed. 1940). Determining the necessity for
secrecy of a document on the ground of privilege falls upon the court. Wigmore asks:
"Shall every subordinate in the department have access to the secret, and not the presiding
officer of justice? The truth cannot be escaped that a court which abdicates its inherent
function of determining the facts upon which the admissibility of evidence depends will
furnish to bureaucratic officials too ample opportunities for abusing the privilege." Id.
at 799.
88. Mr. Justice Holmes has indicated the dangers inherent in such a mechanical
approach to the solution of legal problems: "It is one of the misfortunes of the law
that ideas become encysted in phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke
further analysis." Dissent in Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 384 at 391 (1911).
89. It has been the purpose of this discussion to present, rather than to solve, one of
today's most pressing problems. Even if the Supreme Court decides to accord the
proposed protection to freedom of information, it can not be expected that the problem
will at once cease to exist. In the words of Justice Frankfurter: ". . . the mere
formulation of a relevant Constitutional principle is the beginning of the solution of a
problem, not its answer." McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).

